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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
SUSPENSION OF THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF ALIENATION AS
OCCASIONED BY A POWER OF APPOINTMENT.
The importance of the law concerning the subject of "powers"
cannot be over-emphasized. It is not the purpose of this note to
give an exhaustive discussion of the law of "powers" but merely to
indicate the nature of a "power" and how it may sometimes occasion
a suspension of the power of alienation beyond the statutory period.
"Powers of appointment, otherwise simply called 'powers,'
originated in connection with the creation of future uses, particu-
larly springing uses." 1 Such a power under the Statute of Uses was
an authority enabling a person to dispose of an interest in real prop-
erty, vested either in himself or another person.2 The New York
statute 3 now defines a power as "an authority to do an act in relation
to real property, or to the creation or revocation of an estate therein,
or a charge thereon, which the owner, granting or reserving the
power, might himself lawfully perform." A power is not an estate
or interest in lands; unexercised, it is an incumbrance, and when
exercised, the acts performed by virtue of it are considered and con-
strued as done by the donor of the power.4 Although a power is not
an estate or interest in land, it is an authority to create an estate or
interest, and such a power may be given to a person who has an
estate in the land or to a mere stranger. 5 The creation of a power
may be effected either by means of a deed or will.6 The statute so
provides. 7 No formal set of words are necessary to create or re-
serve a power,8 and such a power may be vested in any person capable
of holding real property but it cannot be exercised unless the donee
of the power also has the capacity of transferring real property.9
'I BURDICK, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1914) 722.
23 BOUVIER (8th ed. 1914) 2646.
'N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §131; see Stanley v. Payne, 65 Misc. 77, 119
N. Y. Supp. 570 (1909) ; nota bene: In considering powers the courts must look
to the provisions of art. V, N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §§130-182, wherein the
subject of powers is now defined.
'Eells v. Lynch, 21 N. Y. Super. (8 Bosw.) 465, 482 (1861); Root v.
Stuyvesant, 18 Wend. 257, 283 (N. Y. 1837).
'Root v. Stuyvesant, supra note 4.
'2 WASHBURN, REAL PROP. (2d ed. 1876) 650; 4 KENT'S CoM. (12th
ed. 1873) 319.
7N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §140.
'4 KENT's Com., supra note 6, 319; Dorland v. Dorland, 2 Barb. 63, 80
(N. Y. 1847); Hubbard v. Gilbert, 25 Hun 596, 599 (N. Y. 1881).
'N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §141; Weeks v. Frankel, 197 N. Y. 304,
90 N. E. 969 (1910); Matter of Mayo, 76 Misc. 416, 136 N. Y. Supp. 1066
(1912).
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And finally, it is to be noted that powers connected with personal
property are now, for all practical purposes, co-extensive with powers
in the law of real property of this state, and they are governed by
the same rules.10
It has often been said that the absolute suspension of the power
of alienation can be effected in only two ways, namely, by certain
contingencies in future estates, and by certain express trusts." It
would appear, however, that there is a third way in which the sus-
pension of the absolute power of alienation can be occasioned, and
that is by a power.1 2 That a suspension can be so effected "by an
instrument in execution of a power," is recognized by the statute 13
which further provides, that the period of such suspension shall be
computed "not from the date of such instrument, but from the time
of the creation of power." This statement, however, that the power
of alienation may be suspended by an instrument in execution of a
power, is by no means inconsistent in any manner with the proposi-
tion that a suspension can only be occasioned by certain contingencies
or trusts. What actually is meant when it is said that a suspensiorf
may be caused by a power, is simply this: "that the power of aliena-
tion may be suspended, not only by means of a grant or a will of
the owner of the title but also by means of an instrument by which
the grantee executes the power." And when the cases are examined
in order to determine in what way the suspension was caused by the
instrument in execution of the power, it will be found that the same
manner of disposition which the grantor of the power might have
adopted, was the sole cause for the suspension. 14 For according to
the statute, "an estate or interest in land cannot be given, or limited
to any person, by an instrument in execution of a power, unless it
would have been valid, if given or limited at the time of the creation
of the power." 15 Hence, the grantee of the power, if he is so au-
'Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N. Y. 522, 547 (1881); Hutton v. Benkard, 92
N. Y. 295 (1883); N. Y. Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Livingston, 133 N. Y.
125, 30 N. E. 724 (1892); Mills v. Husson et al., 140 N. Y. 99, 35
N. E. 422 (1893); Cochrane v. Schell, 140 N. Y. 516, 35 N. E. 971
(1894) ; Fargo v. Squiers, 154 N. Y. 250, 48 N. E. 509 (1897); Matter of
Moehring, 154 N. Y. 423, 48 N. E. 818 (1897); Lockwoode v. Mildeberg,
159 N. Y. 181, 53 N. E. 803 (1899); Matter of Wilkins, 183 N. Y. 104,
75 N. E. 1105 (1905); Matter of Kellogg, 187 N. Y. 355, 80 N. E. 207
(1907) ; Matter of Mayo, supra note 9 at 419.
'CHAPLIN, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION (3rd ed. 1928)
§316; see Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61, 121 (N. Y. 1836); Leonard v. Burr,
18 N. Y. 96, 107 (1858); Everitt v. Everitt, 29 N. Y. 39, 71-72 (1864) ; Smith
v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 92, 102 (1882) ; Radley v. Kuhn, 97 N. Y. 26, 34 (1884) ;
Steinway v. Steinway, 163 N. Y. 183, 57 N. E. 312 (1900) ; Wilber v. Wilber,
165 N. Y. 451, 59 N. E. 264 (1901).
' CHAPLIN, sutpra note 11, §§316, 317.
,' N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §178; see CHAPLIN, supra note 11, §316.
" CHAPLIN, supra note 11, §318.
" Ibid. §318; N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §179; Everitt v. Everitt, supra
note 11 at p. 78.
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thorized, might effect a suspension by the creation of certain express
trusts, or by the limitation of certain contingent future estates, and
the validity of the period of suspension would be determined by
computing the same from the time of the creation of the power.
In such cases, while the suspension may in fact be brought into
operation through the power, the manner in which the suspension
is effected, is still found to be by an express trust or contingency. 16
But "there are cases where, if a power to alienate is created, to be
exercised at the expiration of a period not duly measured by lives in
being, and its exercise in the meantime is expressly prohibited, 'the
power does suspend the absolute power of alienation until that time
and is therefore void.'" 17 In the Matter of Butterfield 18 the will
of testator provided that no part of his estate shall be sold until all
of his children arrive at the age of twenty-one. At his death, five
of his eight children were under that age. The will also conferred
a trust power of sale on the executrix. "The estate of the devisees
was thus subject to the trust power, so that they (the devisees)
could not convey a clear title until the five minors had reached
twenty-one. * * * The executrix is here absolutely prevented from
making a sale for a time limited by the arrival of the five minors
at maturity * * * and until that time the conveyance of the devisees
would be liable to be defeated by the subsequent execution of the
power." Hence, as there were no persons in being by whom an ab-
solute fee in possession could be conveyed, there resulted a suspen-
sion in contravention to the prescribed limit.19 Were it not for the
power, no suspension would have resulted as all the devisees, who
could in any event take, were in being, could have joined in a con-
veyance of the entire fee. Thus as the purpose of the instrument
was obviously one intended to prevent any conveyance of the prop-
erty during a term not duly measured, the entire scheme of the will
was held to be invalid.2
0
"* CHAPLIN, supra note 11, §318.
1 Ibid. §316; Matter of Christie, 59 Hun 153, 158, 13 N. Y. Supp. 202,
aff'd as Matter of Butterfield (Christie), 133 N. Y. 473, 31 N. E. 515 (1892).
Ibid.
a' N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §42: "The absolute power of alienation is
suspended, when there are no persons in being by whom an absolute fee in
possession can be conveyed. Every future estate shall be void in its creation,
which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation, by any limitation or con-
dition whatever for a longer period than during the continuance of not more
than two lives in being at the creation of the estate."
' See, also, Adams v. Berger, 27 Abb. N. C. 429, 18 N. Y. Supp. 33 (1891);
Goldsmith v. Haskell, 181 App. Div. 510, 169 N. Y. Supp. 185 (1st Dept. 1910);
Matter of Chittick, 243 N. Y. 304, 153 N. E. 83 (1926). In the last case cited,
the court said, at pp. 318, 319: "The difficulty arises over the attempt of the
testator to make provision for all the children of his daughter, including those
who may be subsequently born, and not in being at the time of his death. If
the daughter should die and the granddaughter should die, and then the disposi-
tion of the principal should be suspended for twenty-five years during the life
of a grandchild born after the death of the testator, here we should have the
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Not all powers will cause, or co-operate to cause, a suspension,
and there is such a class of powers which does not cause any sus-
pension whatever. 2 ' It will be found that the powers that will cause
a suspension are usually those which involve an absence of persons
in being who can grant out an absolute fee in possession, or are
such powers, that coupled with other causes, bring about such a
result. To illustrate, resort is to be had to the decided cases. In
the case of Garvey v. McDevitt 22 the testator directed his executors,
four years after his decease to sell his real estate at public or private
sale and pay over the proceeds to the Bishop of Raphoe upon cer-
tain trusts. If "the will had directed the proceeds of the sale of
this real estate to be paid over absolutely to the Bishop of Raphoe
for his own use, there would have been no difficulty with this power
to be exercised after the lapse of four years. In that case he being
the sole beneficiary of the power in his own right could have re-
leased his right to the proceeds to the heirs of the testator and thus
perfected in them an absolute title, which could not afterward be
defeated by his exercise of the power. But the difficulty here is,
the proceeds were not to be paid over to the Bishop in his own
right. They were to be paid to him as a trustee. *** He was to
have no personal or private interest in the fund. ' : * * He could not,
therefore, release to the heirs. * * * Notwithstanding anything he
may do during the four years, the executors must sell, and pay
over the proceeds to him or his successor, as trustee. Therefore,
during the four years there are no persons in being who can convey
an absolute fee in possession." Here, then, we find a power, that
because it cannot be exercised before a certain period ends, co-
operates to cause the suspension, for during the period before the
power is exercised there are no persons in being who could get to-
gether and convey the absolute fee.
2 3
Some powers are of such a nature that they cannot be exercised
without effecting an illegal suspension and hence all such powers
are invalid. In the exercise of every power there must be a sub-
stantial compliance not only with the spirit but also with the letter of
the power.2 4. But it is always the intention of the grantor- of the
power as to the manner, time and conditions of its execution that
power of alienation or the suspension of disposition for more than two lives in
being-the two lives having gone out, the power of disposition would be sus-
pended until the child or children, born after the testator's death, arrive at
twenty-five." The trust was held void because of the undue suspension.
I For a detailed discussion of such class of powers and relative cases, see
CHAPLIX, supra note 11, §§322-332.
=72 N. Y. 556, 561, 563, 564 (1878).
See, also, Allen v. Allen, 149 N. Y. 280, 43 N. E. 626 (1896) ; Stoiber v.
Stoiber, 40 App. Div. 156, 57 N. Y. Supp. 916 (2d Dept. 1899) ; Hagemeyer v.
Saulpaugh, 97 App. Div. 535, 90 N. Y. Supp. 228 (lst Dept. 1904).
'Harris v. Strodl, 132 N. Y. 392, 30 N. E. 962 (1892) at p. 397: "The
general rule is that to the due execution of a power there must be a substantial
compliance with every condition required to precede or accompany its exercise."
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must be observed.25 Thus it has been held that where a power is
given under express conditions that it cannot be exercised until a
future time, and not until that time, and it cannot be annulled or
released, and that because of such conditions the absolute power of
alienation is suspended beyond a period measured by two lives in
being, the entire power is void.26 Hence, the time when the power
is to be executed may be material to its validity. In Hawley v.
James 27 Judge Bronson said: "The time when the power is to be
executed may be material to its validity. There are no means by
which the alienation can be suspended beyond the period prescribed
in the first article; and we shall find, I think, the same difficulty on
that point, when the case is examined under the doctrine of powers
that was presented when considering it as an express trust. * * *
The power can only be executed at the time and in the manner pre-
scribed by the testator. * * * By the will the final distribution is to
be made and the conveyances executed at the expiration of the
period herein prescribed for the continuance of the trust. It can only
be done when all the minorities shall have ceased and if none can
in the meantime convey an absolute fee in the land, then we have
already seen that the power of alienation is suspended for a longer
period than the statute allows. * * * What kind of a fee can be
conveyed so long as a power exists by which it may be thoroughly
defeated? It surely is not an absolute fee. The power by which the
new estates are to be created cannot be released or in any way de-
stroyed." Later, in Hone's Executors v. Van Schaick 28 Judge
Bronson affirms the above principles. In distinguishing the latter
case from Root v. Stuyvesant 29 he said: "That, however, was a
power which the grantees might execute or not at their pleasure.
It imposed no duty on the tenants for life; it did not require them
to do an illegal act. But this is a special power in trust, and it is
imperative. It imposes a duty on the grantees, the performance of
which may be compelled in equity for the benefit of the parties in-
terested * * *. The testator has directed such a division and con-
veyance of his estate at the end of the time as the law has forbidden.
Such a power cannot, I think, be upheld for any purpose." Thus
it would seem to be fairly clear that where there is a power to ap-
point and it is imperative and must be executed according to the
intentions of the testator, and it further appears that no alienation
is possible within the prescribed period, the power is invalid. In
Dana v. Murray 30 there was such a power in trust to sell and an
imperative power to pay over the proceeds at a future date to all
I N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 172.
'Matter of Butterfield, smpra note 17; Hetzel v. Barber, 69 N. Y. 1, 12
(1887) ; Beekman v. Bonsoor, 23 N. Y. 298, 317 (1861).
- Supra note 11 at p. 175.
'20 Wend. 564, 567 (N. Y. 1838).
'Supra note 4.
122 N. Y. 604, 26 N. E. 21 (1890).
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the then living members of a certain designated class, including such
persons as were not in being at the creation of the power. The
power could not be executed nor the beneficiaries become known
within the period of two lives in being. The court said: "Such
proceeds were directed to be divided among all of her children who
may then be living, and the issue of any of them who may be
dead * * *. It follows that the power in question, under the ex-
press provision of the statute is imperative, and its execution will
be compelled by the court; and this being the case, it operates to
suspend the vesting of the fee, until the power is executed or the
estate is terminated. The suspension here is caused by the fact
that there are persons not in being at the creation of the power, who
may become entitled to take. All the persons then in being could
not effct a conveyance of the absolute fee and accordingly the abso-
lute power of alienation is suspended." 31
Both the courts and the text-writers are unanimous in holding
that the period during which the absolute right of alienation may
be suspended by an instrument in the exercise of a power of ap-
pointment is measured from the time of the creation and not the
time of the exercise of the power.32  This rule which existed at
common law 33 is now embodied in the statute.3 4 A reason given
for this rule which requires computation of the suspension from the
time of the creation and not from the exercise of the power, is that
"if this were not the case, estates for life with powers of appoint-
ment by will might be created, the tenants for life might appoint
for life, with powers to the appointees to appoint by will; these
appointees might in their turn, appoint in like manner, and so an
indefinite series of life estates could be created." 35 This situation
could not, of course, exist today for even the statutory definition
of a power limits the grantee of the power to do only such acts
"which the owner, granting or reserving the power, might himself
lawfully perform." 36
"A typical case for the application of the principle is the fol-
lowing: A, by will leaves property to X, in trust to pay over the
income to B for life, and upon B's death to transfer the principal
to such persons as B shall by will appoint. B's will executes the
See Booth v. Baptist Church et al., 126 N. Y. 215, 28 N. E. 238 (1891,).
' CHAPLIN, supra note 11, §§359, 360; GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES(3rd ed. 1915) §§514, 515; Genet v. Hunt, 113 N. Y. 158, 21 N. E. 91 (1889) ;
Dana v. Murray, 122 N. Y. 604, 26 N. E. 21 (1890); Maitland v. Baldwin,
70 Hun 267, 24 N. Y. Supp. 29 (1893); Hillen v. Iselin, 144 N. Y. 365, 39
N. E. 368 (1895) ; Fargo v. Squiers, supra note 10; Re of Pilsbury, 50 Misc.
367, 99 N. Y. Supp. 62, aff'd, without opinion, in 113 App. Div. 893, 99 N. Y.
Supp. 72 (3rd Dept. 1906), and also aff'd in 186 N. Y. 545, 79 N. E. 114
(1906); Re Banker's Trust Co., 82 Misc. 375, 143 N. Y. Supp. 483 (1913).
' GRAY, supra note 32, §§514, 515.
N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §178.
'GRAY, supra note 32, §514.
'IN. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §131.
.385
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power of appointment by leaving the property to Y in trust to pay
the income for life to C, who had not been born at the time of A's
death. The trust for C is invalid as an illegal suspension of the
power of alienation." 37 Construing the exercise of the power as
of the time of the creation, it will be seen that there was a suspen-
sion during the life of B and then of a person not in.being. It
could not be ascertained at the death of the testator when such per-
son would be born, if ever, and hence there would be a suspension
not duly measured. "Similarly, if the trust created by B's will were
for the benefit of M and N for the life of the survivor, then even
though M and N were living at A's death, B's disposition would be
invalid, for the power of alienation would be suspended for three
lives." 38 The situation in the "Re of Dodge's Estate" 39 further
illustrates the rule. In that case the testator had created a trust
for the benefit of his son for life and he also gave his son the power
to dispose of the fund by will. The son's will in execution of the
power gave the income of the fund to his father for life, with the
direction that on the death of his father, the fund was to be divided
among three designated brothers share and share alike, the income
of a share each to be paid to each of the three brothers for life and
upon their death provision was made for the remainders over. The
father and one of the brothers died before the son who was the
grantee of the power. In considering the question as to whether
the exercise of the power had illegally suspended the power of
alienation the court said: "It is conceded, of course, that in deter-
mining this question the two wills must be read together (Fargo v.
Squiers, 154 N. Y. 250, 48 N. E. 509). The will of (the grantor)
the power suspends the power of alienation during the life of
said son (grantee of power) and the latter could in his will, there-
fore, suspend the alienation of the trust fund during one additional
life only (Hillen v. Iselin, 144 N. Y. 365, 39 N. E. 368), whereas
in fact he created by his will trusts to run through (1) the life of
his father, and (2) the lives of three brothers, respectively. Had
his father * * * survived him, this provision in the son's will would
violate the statute, for in conjunction with the suspension of aliena-
Marsh, Perpetuities Arisihg Through Powers of Appointment in New
York (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 521; Fargo v. Squiers, supra note 10. In that
case, at p. 259, the court said: "The validity of the provisions of the will of
Georgia Fargo, in so far as she attempted to execute the power of appointment,
must, therefore, be tested by reading the provisions of her will into the provi-
sions of the will of William G. Fargo, which created the power. So tested, we
find that the Squiers children, not being in existence at the time of the death of
William G. Fargo, any attempt to postpone the absolute ownership of property
in these children would be a violation of the statute." See, also, Genet v. Hunt,
sutpra note 32. It re Trowbridges Est., 124 Misc. 317, 208 N. Y. Supp. 662
(1924).
' Marsh, Perpetuities Arising Through Powers of Appointment in New
York, supra note 37 at 522; Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N. Y. 266,
85 N. E. 59 (1908).
" 129 Misc. 390, 220 N. Y. Supp. 247, 249 (1927).
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tion of one life (his own) he would have extended the trusts through
two additional lives."
The propositions here outlined have been recently applied by
the Court of Appeals.4  The testator, by his will, directed that his
residuary estate be divided into three shares upon trusts and limita-
tions as follows: one share to be held in trust for A, his wife, during
her life, with power to appoint the remainder to her sons, D and C,
and their issue in such proportions as she chose, and then two other
trusts for his sons D and C upon certain limitations, not here ma-
terial. Then followed a proviso the effect of which was construed
as converting any part of the residuary estate which would go to
the sons, D and C, from an apparent absolute fee into a life estate
with remainder to the surviving issues of both D and C. D died
without issue leaving his entire estate to his mother, A. A then
died leaving a will by which she appointed to her son C the share
which had been held in trust for her life. The sole issue of C is
a daughter X. Both C and X are living. In construing the provi-
sion of the will which created the trust with power of appointment
in A, it was held, that as to the real estate in such trust, the gift as
to the issue or descendants surviving D and C, postponed the vest-
ing of the remainders to such issue for more than two lives in being
at the death of the testator. By his will the testator suspended the
power of alienation during the life of A, his wife, and then A, by
her power of appointment, in conjunction with the effect of the
proviso, suspended it for another life by appointing the property to
C. So far there has been no undue suspension. But to determine
the validity of the gift over to the issue or descendants of D and C,
the appointment under the power is to be read into the will of the
testator, by which the power was created, and the resulting suspen-
sion, if any, is to be computed from the time the power is created
and not from the time it is exercised. Hence, the gift over to the
issue, upon the death of the testator, should have been so framed
that they would vest in interest at the end of two lives. But this
was not done, as by the proviso in the will, the testator did not con-
fine the gift over to the issue of the son for whom the trust has
been established, but the issue of both sons are to share in the divi-
sion of the gift. The issue who will share in such gift cannot be
ascertained until the death of both sons, D and C. It is true that D
had died without issue during the lifetime of both A and C, with
the result that at the death of C, who is the holder of the life estate
under the power, his issue will be the only persons entitled to share
in the remainder. "The validity of the gift must, however, be de-
termined according to the possibilities that are present at the death
of the testator." At that time both D and C were living and it was
not known which would die first and whether or not he would leave
issue. If both had survived the death of A, even though she ap-
"Bishop v. Bishop, 257 N. Y. 40, 177 N. E. 302 (1931).
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pointed her trust share to C alone, the gift over would be divided
among a class made up of the issue of both D and C and not until
they were both dead could the members of such class be ascertained.
"The result is the postponement of the vesting beyond the statutory
period."
The court held the remainder invalid because it did not vest
within the statutory period applying the rule of Matter of Wilcox.41
While the case is clearly sustainable on this ground and sets at rest
all doubts as to the present strength of the rule against the remote-
ness of vesting, it is nevertheless well to point out that the same
result might have been reached without invoking the Matter of
Wilcox. For it is clear that at the death of the testator the re-
mainder to the children of both D and C was limited to unborn per-
sons whose identity might not be determined within two lives. The
power of alienation was therefore suspended for longer than the
period permitted by the statute. Since the court preferred to decide
the case on the authority of Matter of Wilcox, it can only be for
the purpose of re-affirming the doctrine of that case.
ALFRED R. Voso.
41194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497 (1909).
